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Abstract 
This article critiques institutionalist literature on varieties of capitalism and the more 
régulationist comparative capitalism approach. It elaborates the alternative concept 
of variegated capitalism and suggests that this can be studied fruitfully through a 
synthesis of materialist form analysis and historical institutionalism within a world-
market perspective, highlights the role of institutional and spatiotemporal fixes that 
produce temporary, partial, and unstable zones of stability (and corresponding zones 
of instability) within the limits of the crisis-prone capital relation, and illustrates this 
from the crisis of crisis-management in the Eurozone crisis. 
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Introduction 
Classical political economy noted important variations in the world market. This 
tradition continued in studies of primitive accumulation, mercantilism, imperialism, 
colonialism, and so on. These studies considered economic spaces from the urban 
through to the emerging world market. Recent research on varieties of capitalism 
(notably the Hall-Soskice school and its epigones) has less historical depth, more 
limited comparative breadth, and a narrow theoretical focus. This article builds on the 
earlier tradition, especially its historical materialist and régulationist versions, to 






Studies of diversity and variation 
 
No consensus exists on schemes for exploring the unity and heterogeneity of 
capitalism. Table 1 shows four methods used to develop such schemes: taxonomy, 
ideal-types, cluster analysis, and logical-historical analysis. Taxonomists distinguish 
several ‘families of capitalism’, often focusing on advanced capitalist economies, with 
less work done on other families, let alone their subordinate genera and species. 
Typology is most useful when just a few ideal types are used to disclose hybridity, 
impurity, ‘cocktails’, and other forms of real world complexity. Cluster analysis uses 
statistical induction to produce a set of clusters (sometimes with sub-clusters) and, 
perhaps, outliers, based on the within-cluster similarity of members on multiple 
selected criteria and/or on similarities in the weight of revealed latent factors. Finally, 
the logical-historical approach uses theoretically-informed comparison to move 
stepwise from abstract-simple categories to concrete-complex analyses of cases. 
This method is quite common in the Marxist critique of political economy. 
All four methods can be used to reveal key features of individual varieties, the 
extent of within-type diversity, and the overall heterogeneity of capitalism. The first 
three are less useful, however, for an integrated and dynamic analysis of uneven 
accumulation on a world scale because they tend to treat each variety, ideal-type, or 
cluster separately rather than exploring interdependencies, complementarities, 
contradictions, and co-evolution. This article advances the logical-historical method 
by introducing some interconnected concepts that are largely missing in other 
methods: variegation, the world market, compossibility, and ecological dominance. 
The first three methods share a broad institutionalist hypothesis that economic 
performance is likely to be better in the presence of the institutional conditions for 
effective strategic coordination and adaptation among relevant stakeholders. The list 
of these conditions and explanations for their emergence and survival varies with the 
theoretical focus as well as which of four kinds of institutional analysis is adopted. 
Rational choice institutionalism shares many failings of neo-classical economics 
and, when it yields interesting results, often does so in terms of the logic of situated 
action (cf. Katznelson and Weingast 2010). This is seen in the Hall-Soskice firm-
centred ‘explanation’ for the lesser efficiency of hybrid cases compared to pure 
liberal or pure coordinated regimes. 
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Table 1: Analytical strategies for studying the variety/diversity of capitalism 
 
Analytical 
strategy Key features Examples 
Taxonomic 
classification 
Empirical observation of actual cases, 
aims to be complete, and includes 
horizontal and vertical ordering of taxa. 
Different taxonomic principles produce 
different taxonomies. A taxon is pure. 
Taxonomies produced by 
international agencies 
(e.g., IMF, World Bank, 




Theoretically-guided ideal types built 
for heuristic purposes. Number of 
types varies with purpose. Different 
purposes produce different typologies. 
Implies impurity and hybridity of cases. 
Weber (1968); Albert 
(1993); varieties of 
capitalism; business 




Induction from statistical analysis of a 
population or a purposive sample of 
cases to identify more or less distinct 
clusters, their relative proximity, and 
their nesting in given property space. 
Amable (2003); Kogut and 
Ragin (2006); Hall and 





Theoretically-guided reconstruction of 
actual cases; concepts may be 
modified during analysis. Number of 
types depends on concreteness-
complexity of given research object 
Historical materialism; 





Sociological institutionalism explores the social embedding of economic action, the 
key role of extra-economic institutional supports to economic action, and, recently, 
the effects of the neo-liberal disembedding of market forces from their social 
integument. Such work offers a useful counterfoil to studies that consider the market 
economy in isolation (or abstraction) from its wider social context (e.g., Streeck 
2010) and can also provide a useful supplement to the form-analytical approach 
developed below. 
Historical institutionalism in turn combines evolutionary and institutional concerns 
with interest in path-dependency and path-shaping and is more common in work on 
the diversity of capitalism than on its distinctive varieties. Noting that history and 
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temporality matter, it examines institutional inertia, institutional transformation, and 
institutional rupture (e.g., Pierson 2004). For this reason, it partly overlaps with 
‘middle-range’ or more concrete-complex logical-historical analyses. Some studies 
also explore forms or stages of capitalism (and their variation and diversity) and 
contribute thereby to comparative and historical studies of capitalist formations. This 
approach can also clarify how institutional and spatiotemporal fixes help to stabilise 
specific regimes (see Jessop 2001 and below). 
Lastly, the discursive or ideational approach is a late, somewhat opportunistic, 
arrival. It can mean little more than that ideas matter as much as (if not more than) 
institutions. More substantially, it claims that ideas mediate institutional effects; that 
institutions filter the role of discourses; and/or that they reflect, embody, or reproduce 
particular social imaginaries, discursive practices, and projects (e.g., Schmidt 2010). 
These claims could help to advance the critique of political economy, which, starting 
with Marx, also criticised the socially constitutive ‘categories’ through which classical 
and, later, vulgar political economists construed bourgeois society. To realise this 
potential, however, these claims must be related to the diverse factors that shape the 
variation, selection, retention, and re-contextualisation of ‘ideas’ in specific 
conjunctures. 
In sum, these four institutional approaches imply that economies perform well, 
respectively: (1) to the extent that the conditions for capitalist economic rationality 
are present; (2) the market economy is embedded in a market society; (3) chance 
discoveries and/or gradual or punctuated evolution select the right set of institutional 
complementarities or isomorphism; or (4) for whatever reason, ‘the ideation is right’. 
In contrast, the alternative proposed below regards continuing accumulation in a 
specific economic space as improbable thanks to capital’s inherent contradictions, 
dilemmas, and antagonisms. Even when an economic space dominated by capitalist 
social relations seems to perform well according to prevailing capitalist criteria (and, 
therefore, would be diagnosed as effective in mainstream work), this outcome is 
necessarily provisional and depends on specific institutional and spatiotemporal fixes 
that succeed, for a time, in displacing and/or deferring crisis-tendencies. The latter 
will sooner or later intensify, change their forms of appearance, produce ‘blowback’ 
effects, or generate resistance that undermine these fixes, overwhelm crisis-
management routines, or, in the case of resistance, weaken, neutralise, or overthrow 
prevailing forms of exploitation and domination. This approach leads to major 
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differences about the spatiotemporal horizons of analysis of diversity and variety as 
well as about crisis dynamics. In particular, it posits the world market as the ultimate 
horizon of analysis and considers these topics from this perspective. 
 
Diversity, variety, or variegation? 
 
Mainstream sociological and historical institutional research on diversity and/or 
variety tends to adopt a methodologically nationalist (or, less often, a local or 
regional) view on instantiations of ‘capitalism’. The scare quotes around capitalism 
are to warn that many studies fail to define this crucial concept, taking it for granted. 
Apart from this, there are four other problems that pervade mainstream research. 
First, in isolating distinct families of capitalism (via taxonomic classification, the 
construction of ideal types, or cluster analysis), it often neglects their interrelations. 
Second, in listing the institutional complementarities or isomorphisms that underpin 
‘good’ economic performance (usually measured by one or more macroeconomic 
indicators), it focuses on factors internal to a given type of capitalism. Third, given 
the rather brief historical periods studied in mainstream work, it does not relate short- 
or medium-term secular or cyclical performance to longer-term dynamics (such as 
hegemonic cycles, Kondratieff waves, transitions between regimes such as the rise 
of finance-led accumulation, or long-term shifts in regional or global growth poles). 
Fourth, this literature tends to assume that all varieties of capitalism (VoC) are 
analytically equal – they just happen to occupy different places on a continuum, in a 
two-dimensional property space, or in a more complex, n-dimensional matrix. Or, if 
one type proves superior to others in a given time frame on relevant indicators, 
competitive pressures will oblige less successful regimes to ‘adapt or die’. This 
sometimes leads to prescriptive remarks on the efficiency and desirability of a neo-
liberal turn or, less often, the ability of a coordinated market economy to avoid the 
worst aspects of its more crisis-prone, inequality-generating (neo-)liberal counterpart. 
The variegated capitalism approach proposed here is informed by the Marxist 
critique of political economy. Based on this, my responses to the four problems just 
identified are indicated in Table 2 but, for brevity’s sake, not elaborated individually 
(for more detail, see Jessop 2011b, 2012). Their interconnections are nonetheless 
explored when I consider variegation at different scales in the world market. 
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Table 2: Varieties of capitalism vs variegated capitalism 
 
Varieties of capitalism Variegated capitalism 
Examine distinct (families of) local, 
regional, national models as rivals on 
the same scale or terrain for the same 
stakes 
Study complementarities and 
tensions among models across 
scales in a tendentially singular, 
global but variegated capitalism 
Describe forms of internal coherence of 
distinct VoC on the false assumption 
that they can and do exist in relative 
isolation from each other and, hence, 
that stability is also endogenous 
Study how zones of relative stability 
are linked over time to instability in 
or beyond given economic spaces in 
a complex ecology of accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation 
Study temporal rhythms and horizons 
of VoC as internal, specific, short- or 
medium-term, unrelated to the longer 
term dynamics of the world market 
Analyse the costs associated with 
uneven capacities to displace or 
defer contradictions, conflicts, and 
crisis-tendencies 
If one variety is more ‘productive’, 
‘efficient’, or ‘progressive’, it will expand 
via competition and/or be imitated, 
exported, or even imposed elsewhere 
Some varieties are more equal (or 
ecologically dominant than others). 
The dominant model cannot be 
adopted everywhere.  
 
The logical-historical approach and critical institutionalism 
 
I now suggest how form-analysis and institutionalism can be combined in a logical-
historical approach to produce a more powerful account of variegated capitalism as 
an alternative theoretical object to the understanding of capitalism posited in the VoC 
literature. This synthesis can be justified by noting that (1) specific social forms can 
be studied as conflictual social relations (Poulantzas 1975) and (2) profit-oriented, 
market-mediated accumulation is an instituted process (Polanyi 1957). More 
precisely, they can be examined in terms of how the changing institutional matrix 
through which social forms are instantiated is a product of past social conflicts and 
past institutional developments and, as such, entails a selective terrain with specific 
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structural and strategic biases favourable to some social forces rather than others 
(Poulantzas 1978). This also holds for the capital relation. The latter involves a 
nexus of institutions that express, and articulate, its different forms and that, in 
certain conditions, may help stabilise this relation by facilitating and consolidating 
compromises within and among the dominant classes, supporting classes, 
dominated classes, and other forces (for a similar starting point plus conclusions on 
policy analysis, see Kannankulam and Georgi, this issue). For example, a key aspect 
of securing the conditions for capitalist reproduction is the ability of dominant forces 
to confine conflicts generated by the capital relation within this institutional matrix 
and postpone the moment when they overflow these constraints. 
More generally, this issue can be related to institutional and spatiotemporal fixes. 
An institutional fix is a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, 
imitation, imposition, or chance evolution, provides a temporary, partial, and 
relatively stable solution to the challenges of securing economic, political, or social 
order. It is not purely technical but rests, at best, on an unstable equilibrium of 
compromise and, at worst, on open use of force. The concept of spatiotemporal fix 
overlaps in part with institutional fix and concerns the capacity to secure order within 
a given spatiotemporal framework by displacing and/or deferring crisis-tendencies 
and other potentially destabilising challenges and threats. 
This said, analyses of accumulation should not be confined to its institutional 
matrix, whether this is analysed from rational choice, sociological, historical, or 
ideational perspectives. Critical institutionalism cannot limit its theoretical horizons to 
institutions for at least three reasons. First, mainstream institutional analysis typically 
presupposes the generic features of capitalism, tends to ignore the fundamental 
roots of crisis in the basic, incompressible contradictions of the capital relation, with 
all that this implies for the temporary, partial, and unstable nature of prevailing 
accumulation regimes patterns and their dependence on institutional and 
spatiotemporal fixes. And, if it does note these contradictions, it assumes they can 
be harmonised more or less effectively, at least in advanced capitalist formations 
with sound institutions. This assumption was strongly criticised in classical Marxism 
even if it is now adopted in later currents, such as some versions of neo-Gramscian 
IPE (for a critical evaluation of this, see Bieling, this issue). Second, any tendencies 
associated with particular accumulation regimes (or modes of growth) operate only in 
so far as the institutions, institutional separations, and institutional complementarities 
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with which they are associated are reproduced. Because institutionalisation is an 
improbable feat, this requires attention to the projects and struggles as well as 
emergent mechanisms involved in the contested reproduction-régulation of these 
features. In short, agency matters – and is often conflictual. And, third, however well 
entrenched particular institutions or sets of institutional complementarities might be, 
they cannot prevent social conflicts from overflowing them. 
These three points can be illustrated from the ability to maintain the institutional 
separation between the economic and the political and, on this basis, to confine the 
economic struggles of subordinate classes within the logic of market forces and their 
political struggles within the competitive logic of electoral majorities. In this way, 
important conditions for bourgeois hegemony or, at least, domination will be secured. 
This is why the forms and development of class and class-relevant conflict are 
crucial to bourgeois domination and must be integrated into detailed analyses of 
differential accumulation (cf. Kannankulam and Georgi, this issue). 
These comments provide one way to distinguish historical materialist research 
from classical and vulgar political economy, neo-classical economics, and the 
economic sociologies that build on these traditions. In his critique of political 
economy, Marx developed a logical-historical analysis that moved from the abstract 
logic of the basic forms of the capital relation to their overdetermination through 
specific institutions and social relations. He focused on the categories, dynamics, 
and substantive irrationality of a mode of production in which the commodity form is 
generalised to labour-power so that workers must sell their capacity to work in the 
labour market. Paradoxically, this is also the focus of the mainstream VoC literature 
– albeit without the explicit recognition of the fundamentally exploitative nature of a 
relation in which it appears that ‘here alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and 
Bentham’ (Marx 1967: 172). Marx criticised this superficial appearance by exploring 
the duality of labour power as use-value and exchange-value and the duality of the 
labour process as a process of material appropriation and transformation of nature 
and as a process organised to valorise labour power and appropriate surplus-value. 
The failure to dig beneath the surface of the capital relation to take account of 
these dualities leads to the typically one-sided mainstream analyses of capitalist 
diversity and variety. Drawing heuristically on régulationist categories, we discover 
that mainstream work tends to view labour either as a passive factor of production or 
as human capital and treats production as a positive-sum game in which capital and 
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labour could (and should) cooperate against nature, competing firms, networks of 
firms, regions, or nations in order to maximise the wealth available for division 
among the cooperating parties. Thus institutionalised compromises, if examined at 
all, are treated as obtaining among market agents or producer groups rather than 
among class forces. This neglects the dual nature of the labour process as material 
production and exploitative valorisation and, a fortiori, misses its emergent logic. The 
latter works behind the backs of the producers, is not reducible to micro-level 
‘games’ with representative agents whose identities and interests are pregiven, and 
subjects all social forces, even the currently most powerful, to its (tendential) laws of 
motion. In ignoring the contradictory and crisis-prone nature of this emergent macro-
logic, mainstream work on capitalist diversity/variety engages at best in meso-level 
historical and comparative studies of production, distribution, and exchange. 
Such research addresses topics such as the mobilisation and allocation of 
money capital to different sectors and activities; the education, vocational training 
and skill profile of the labour force; the role of trade unions (as one producer group 
among others) in economic coordination; the organisation of production as the 
deployment of concrete labour in a particular production process using more or less 
specific assets to produce particular goods and services for sale, and employees’ 
ability and motivation to cooperate to advance a firm’s objectives; the logistics of 
circulation and distribution; the organisation of trade in the markets for such 
commodities; and questions of corporate governance (Table 3). 
This work also tends to focus on the rational organisation of production and trade in 
free markets rather than on capitalist speculation and finance, including control fraud 
and financial ‘criminnovation’, which have been so central in the rise of finance-
dominated accumulation from the 1980s. It also tends to ignore the role of political 
capitalism, referring at best to ‘crony capitalism’ in emerging or dependent market 
economies. In some cases, stable types of capitalism are seen as trial-and-error, co-
selected, mutually beneficial, efficient solutions to substantive coordination problems 
that promote macro-economic performance as well as corporate competitiveness 
and profitability. This latter claim is especially clear in the dominant VoC approach of 
recent years (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 37; cf. Kang 2006: 11f; Hall and Gingerich 
2009). In general, this one-sided approach is largely silent on how labour power is 
exploited in the labour process and neglects capital’s market-mediated appropriation 
of surplus-value, the multi-layered complexity of competition, cooperation, and 
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conflict within and between capital and labour as economic forces, and the 
sometimes violent antagonisms of the capital-labour relation (Gough 1992). 
 
Table 3: One-sidedness of VoC research 
 
Social form Focus of VoC studies Neglected in VoC studies 
Commodity 
Asset specificity of use-values and 
price formation of particular 
commodities 
Exchange value, price formation in 
relation to composition of capital 
and average rate of profit 
Wage 
relation 
Individual and social wage; pay 
design; industrial relations; role of 
supervisors and managers in 
techno-economic efficiency; fit 
between managerial incentives and 
corporate performance 
Determinants of real pay; labour-
power as a fictitious commodity; 
absolute and relative surplus- 
value; management as the exercise 




Skill and skill formation, vocational 
training, education, human capital, 
asset specificity 
Abstract labour; value theory of 
labour; socially necessary labour 
time 
Firm 
Core competences and assets; 
nexus of contracts; firm size and 
market power; clusters, networks; 
global value chains; forms of 
competition; corporate governance 
Firm as capitalist enterprise and 
node in circuit of capital; market 
dominance and monopoly profit; 
place in world market; monopoly 
capital; state monopoly capital 
Knowledge Human capital; R&D; tech transfer; 
radical or incremental innovation 
Abstract labour; general intellect; 
intellectual property rights 
Capital 
Assets to be valorised in given time 
and place; realised profits available 
for re-investment 
Capital in general available for 
allocation to any productive (or 
unproductive) purpose 
State 
Provides efficient solution to some 
coordination problems; focus of 
stakeholder pressures to enhance 
comparative institutional advantage 
Institutional separation of market 
and state causes problems for 
accumulation; ditto, the disjunction 
of world market and many states 
 
These risks can be avoided by studying how various forms of the contradiction 
between use- and exchange-value differentially impact (different fractions of) capital 
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and on (different categories and strata of) labour at different times and places. Thus, 
productive capital is abstract value in motion (notably in the form of realised profits 
available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of already invested time- and place-
specific assets undergoing valorisation; the worker is an abstract unit of labour-
power substitutable by other such units (or, indeed, other factors of production) and 
a concrete individual (or, indeed, a member of a particular collective workforce) with 
specific skills, knowledge and creativity for producing particular goods and services; 
the wage is a cost of production and a source of demand; money circulates as 
potentially world money (in stateless space) and as national currencies subject to 
some measure of state control (with the currency of the dominant economy tending 
to become the reference point for world money); land is both a form of property 
(based on the private appropriation of nature) allocated in terms of expected rents 
and a natural resource (modified by past actions) that is more or less renewable and 
recyclable; knowledge underpins intellectual property rights and is a collective 
resource (the intellectual commons). And so on (Jessop 2002; 2013). 
Given the incomplete, contradictory and dilemmatic nature of the capital relation, 
its dependence on extra-economic factors and forces, and the key role of inherently 
unstable institutional and spatiotemporal fixes, the requisite conditions for continued 
accumulation and/or successful crisis-management in specific conjunctures are 
opaque, indeterminate, and variable. Capital is not an automatic subject: its 
expanded reproduction depends on real subjects. This gives a special force to the 
role of semiosis, imaginaries, and discourses in shaping, mediating, and guiding the 
trial-and-error efforts of different social forces to govern accumulation. For, while 
capital’s contradictions cannot be permanently reconciled in all respects, social 
forces can moderate them provisionally through specific visions, projects, and 
strategies that selectively reconcile some particular interests rather than others and 
link them to an inevitably partial construal of the general interest. Spatiotemporal 
fixes also matter here. They mean that the dominant social forces treat some 
contradictions as more important than others, prioritise one or another aspect of a 
given contradiction (e.g., the wage as cost of production or source of demand), 
handle different contradictions and their primary and secondary aspects at different 
sites and scales of action, and switch between concern with this or that aspect or 
contradiction as its perceived urgency alters (these arguments are elaborated in a 
companion piece in this journal, Jessop 2013). 
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Such fixes also involve building support in and across many conflictual and 
contested fields for a given accumulation strategy, its associated state project(s) 
and, where relevant, hegemonic visions. They contribute by displacing the material 
(stofflich) and social costs of zones of stability elsewhere (into zones of instability) 
and/or deferring them (‘kicking the can down the road’). Further, because the capital 
relation is reproduced – when, where, and to the extent that it is – through social 
agency and entails specific forms, stakes, and sites of conflict and struggle, these 
fixes are not purely technical but linked to patterns of institutionalised conflict and 
compromise, different forms of inclusion, marginalisation, exclusion, and oppression. 
Lastly, when the circuit of capital breaks, however causes, space opens for struggle 
over different trajectories, vitiating unilinear accounts of capitalist development. 
 
Compossibility and ecological dominance 
 
To study the world market in terms of 'variegated capitalism' improves on the claims 
that: (1) there is a single world system in which competition pushes all capitals and 
their related 'space economies' to converge on a single model of capitalism; or (2) 
distinct varieties of capitalism can co-exist in an inevitably heterogeneous world 
economy. Growing world market integration makes it ever less appropriate to study 
‘varieties of capitalism’ as separate regimes that will prove more or less efficient and 
competitive according to the ruthless, ex post audit of market forces. This underlines 
the importance of structural coupling, co-evolution, and mutual complementarities-
exclusivities among VoCs and their impact on differential accumulation at a world 
scale. In short, not everything that is individually possible is compossible. We must 
ask whether different varieties can co-exist in the same economic space and, where 
they are compossible, whether this has benign, neutral, or negative effects on their 
individual and collective economic performance. Two negative examples are the 
pathological co-dependence of the USA and China at a world market level and the 
increasingly dysfunctional articulation of the neo-mercantilist Modell Deutschland 
with the rest of the Eurozone, especially Southern Europe (on the latter, see below). 
Compossibility is related in turn to the claim above that some varieties are more 
equal than others. In part, this involves the differential capacity of the state and 
political forces to use soft power, force, and domination to impose specific patterns 
of valorisation, appropriation, and dispossession. VoC literature ignores this insofar 
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as it assumes that the market and state are separate (at least in advanced capitalist 
economies) and also overlooks the role of violence in accumulation (whether in 
primitive accumulation, colonial conquest, plundering resources, imposing unequal 
treaties, or maintaining dependent development in a ‘variegated imperialism’). 
Variegated capitalism also involves ‘ecological dominance’. In general, this refers 
to how far and how, in a self-organising ecology of systems or institutional orders, 
one system or order is a problem-maker for the others rather than a problem-taker. 
This can be studied in terms of the relative weights of different varieties and/or the 
uneven impact of different circuits of capital. Recall here that these weightings are 
not an automatic, mechanical outcome of market forces but depend on specific 
economic and political strategies, which may include the use of violence as well as 
rigging market rules. Thus one could investigate the conditions making for uneven 
development and structural coupling of capitalist regimes in a regional or global 
division of labour (e.g., the Rhenish, Nordic, and liberal market models in Europe or 
the global dominance of the liberal market model); or, again, examine the weight of 
commercial, industrial, or financial capital in capitalist circuits at different scales. 
These issues are related. For example, the ecological dominance of neo-liberalism 
reflects the politically-engineered predominance of finance-dominated accumulation 
regimes in the world market plus the ecological dominance of financial capital more 
generally in global capitalist circuits (Jessop 2011a). Neither statement entails that 
financial capital, let alone capital as property (fictive capital), has been fully and 
permanently detached from the need for valorisation in the ‘real’ economy. On the 
contrary, the greater and longer its seeming independence, the greater and longer 
are the crises created by the forcible assertion of the organic unity of different 
phases of capital’s metamorphosis (cf. Marx 1968: 509). Last, while the ultimate 
horizon of accumulation is the world market, variegation, compossibility, and 
ecological dominance are fractal phenomena, i.e., they emerge and interact in (self-) 
similar ways at many sites and scales. 
Their fractal nature can be seen in European economic space as rival economic 
and political forces seek to restructure and integrate national economies and states 
in the hope of solving structural ‘problems’ of competitiveness within regions, 
national economies, and wider European economic space. When founded in 1951, 
the European Iron and Steel Community involved six mostly ‘Rhenish’ (or 
‘coordinated market’) economies. The 'Monnet mode of integration' aimed to create a 
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European political regime supportive of various national Fordist modes of 
development (Ziltener 1999). The spillover effects of market integration were 
expected to consolidate regulated capitalism and deepen political integration. 
The European Communities initially developed as relatively compatible, indeed, 
in key respects, already interlocking, variants of regulated capitalism, each with its 
own institutionalised compromises. Each enlargement created more heterogeneity, 
making it harder for positive integration to promote convergence, secure economies 
of scale, and harmonise economic and social policy. Measures to promote the free 
flow of goods, capital, labour, and services damaged the coherence of the respective 
cores of coordinated market economies and advantaged mobile capital. More flexible 
methods of governance, combining centrally agreed targets and decentralised 
implementation, did not offset the growing heterogeneity in accumulation regimes, 
modes of régulation, and insertion into European and wider economic spaces. 
This trend is reflected in what are termed, in technocratically-inclined governing 
circles, ‘misaligned economic structures and lost competitiveness’. More bluntly, 
these problems emerge from significant micro- and macro-economic divergences in 
productivity, unit labour costs, competitiveness, and foreign trade, which are often 
rooted in inherited, but now superseded, economic structures and roles in regional 
and global divisions of labour. These imbalances and disproportions are linked in 
turn to variations in local, regional, and national restructuring and steering capacities, 
in capacities to displace and defer contradictions and crisis-tendencies, and in the 
uneven capacities of weaker capital fractions and subaltern classes to resist the 
imposition of neo-liberal crisis-management panaceas. Unsurprisingly, efforts at EU 
meta-governance have become another site for struggles among member states and 
outside forces about the strategic direction of the EU and/or over specific policies. 
Thus, rather than offering an adequate institutional architecture for governing an 
increasingly heterogeneous European Union and facilitating convergence, negative 
integration plus more flexible coordination methods created a variegated free market 
without strong governance capacities, especially in crisis periods. This problem was 
reinforced with the adoption of the formally demanding Stability and Growth Pact 
followed by Monetary Union – innovations that were expected to produce 
convergence in economic performance through political action to extend (supposedly) 
efficient free markets. Yet no credible institutional arrangements were established to 
enforce long-term fiscal discipline, compensate for uneven development and 
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economic performance, or coordinate crisis-management when conventional crisis 
responses, such as devaluation, were ruled out in advance. This structural flaw was 
obscured during the 1990s ‘Great Moderation’ (linked to US monetary policies and to 
deflation imported from China) and the initial stimulus (notably in Southern Europe) 
that followed the Euro’s introduction. Failure to address this flaw in the good times 
made crisis-management harder with the outbreak of the North Atlantic Financial 
Crisis, the surfacing and intensification of the Eurozone crisis, and issues of 
sovereign debt. Indeed, each new shock further reveals the structural incoherence of 
the Eurozone and the contagious impact of the world market’s crisis-prone dynamics. 
This has produced a crisis of crisis-management at many sites and scales with 
open fights among state managers and business lobbies (reflecting broader disputes 
around capitalist strategies) over how to rescue the Eurozone and the European 
project and/or promote the broader world-market interests of transnational capital 
regardless of particular fallout and blowback effects in European economic and 
political space. There are wider struggles over the balance of sticks and carrots, the 
distribution of gains and losses, and the best way to manage political fallout. The 
crisis has also underlined the contrasting interests of different fractions of capital, 
centre and periphery, deficit and surplus economies, capital and workers, insiders 
and outsiders. This is intensifying the institutional crises in European governance 
structures and undermining the legitimacy of the European project. Efforts at crisis-
management are aggravated in turn by political crises at different scales, including 
splits in national and transnational power blocs, representational and legitimacy 
crises, loss of temporal sovereignty, and institutional failures. This produces a 
continued ‘muddling through’ process reflected in a chaotic sequence of ad hoc and 
poorly coordinated emergency measures, taken in response to successive shocks, 
declining confidence, and the debt-default-deflation dynamics that ensure that 
austerity measures are counter-productive and spread the Eurozone crisis to 




First, research on its diversity/variety requires a robust definition of capitalism. Yet 
mainstream work rarely refers to the historical specificity of the CMP as opposed to 
the market economy more generally, let alone offers a definition that admits that 
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accumulation depends on substantive economic exploitation and class domination. 
Even when capitalism is defined, its listed features rarely extend beyond private 
ownership, wage labour, competition, and an orientation to profit. This makes it hard 
to explain capital’s contradictions and crisis-tendencies and how its always relative 
stability in some places depends on displacing problems into zones of instability 
elsewhere and/or on postponing the eventual onset of crises. 
Second, work on diversity/variety has only recently turned from the positive role 
of finance in the productive and commercial circuits of capital to the distinctive 
features of finance-dominated accumulation and its eventual contributions to 
economic and political instability. Revisiting analyses of finance capital, financial 
capitalism, or money manager capitalism can generate useful insights about 
financialisation but may miss novel features rooted in the greater integration of the 
world market, the changing forms of money as functioning capital and as property, 
and the links of finance-dominated accumulation to new forms of political capitalism. 
Third, rather than focus on local, regional, or national varieties of capitalism, 
future work should consider the hierarchical orderings, centre-periphery relations, 
and patterns of adhesion and exclusion that emerge from the contingencies of the 
world market. While today’s variegated world market is largely organised in the 
shadow of neo-liberalism, the variegated economic space of the European Union 
operates mainly in that of das Modell Deutschland. This confirms the importance of 
studying the variegation, compossibility, and ecological dominance of different 
capitalist regimes and doing so with regard to the fractal nature of such processes. 
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